Abstract: This paper extends the generalized parity vector (gpv) approach for fault detection and isolation (fdi) presented in Omana and Taylor [2] , [3] , [4] , to achieve sensor accommodation. In this study, this fault detection, isolation and accommodation (fdia) technique is implemented on a two-phase separator followed by a three-phase gravity separator model used in oil production facilities. This model simulates a large scale process, which allows the technique to be tested on a high dimensional space with more complex system dynamics. The fault management strategy is significantly improved by implementing a fault size estimation and classification technique using the gpv magnitude signature. This fault characterization is refined by incorporating a recursive fault size recalculation algorithm based on the sensor accommodation error. Two different methods for sensor accommodation and fault size recalculation are proposed to take into account the software and hardware specifications in the plant.
INTRODUCTION
In real world processes, such as oil and gas facilities, continuous production is required to achieve productivity and profitability requirements. As a result, stopping a production line suddenly in the middle of a process, to fix or replace a faulty sensor, may result in significant economic losses. To avoid these unexpected interruptions in the plant operation, sensor accommodation must be integrated as part of the fault management strategy. This provides a temporary solution to keep the safe operation in the system, while maintenance can be scheduled without disturbing significantly the process.
So far, the gpv technique has been successfully tested for fdi using a second-order aircraft engine model [14] , a third-order linearized state-space obtained analytically from the original nonlinear model for a jacketed continuously stirred tank reactor (jcstr) [2] , [3] and a fifth-order identified state-space for a gravity three-phase separation process [15] , [4] . In this paper, the performance of the fault size estimation, classification and sensor accommodation methods proposed is evaluated using the same identified separator model. This allows us to introduce a complete fault detection, isolation and accommodation fdia technique with only input-output data as available information. This paper is outlined as follows: First, a brief overview of stable factorization and its application to implement the generalized parity vector technique is given in section 2. Next, in section 3, sensor and actuator fdi using directional residuals are defined [9] , [10] , [11] . Section 4 presents an overview of the transformation matrix optimization method proposed in Omana and Taylor [2] , [3] and [4] , which handles difficult special cases for sensoractuator fdi. The |GP V | signature is defined in section 5 for further use in fault size estimation and classification in section 5.1. Two different methods for sensor accommodation are presented in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 to fit the hardware specifications of the plant. Correspondingly, two techniques for accommodation error computation and recursive fault size recalculation are presented in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. Finally, section 6 presents the fdia results obtained using the separator model described in [4] for two consecutive faults.
RESIDUAL GENERATION USING THE GENERALIZED PARITY VECTOR TECHNIQUE
The residual generator is implemented using the generalized parity vector technique, which is developed in the stable factorization framework. The significance of using the stable coprime factorization approach is that the parity relations obtained involve stable, proper and rational transfer functions even for unstable plants. Therefore the realizability and stability of the residual generator is guaranteed. Given any n × m proper rational transfer function matrix P(s), it can be expressed in terms of its left coprime factors as follows [12] :
whereÑ(s) andD(s) are called the left coprime factors and belong to the set of stable transfer function matrices. The gpv technique is based on the stable factorization of the system transfer function matrix in terms of its statespace representation. Let the system be described by the set of equations:
where x, u, and y represent the state variables, inputs, and outputs of the system, respectively. Assuming that the pairs (A, B) and (A, C) are stabilizable and detectable, it is possible to select a constant matrix F with appropriate dimensions, such that the matrix A o A − F C is stable. If C is the identity matrix, F = σI + A is a convenient choice. Using the definition of the coprime factorization of P(s) in [13] , the left coprime factors are given by:
Based on the definition of the transfer function matrix P(s) given in (1) and taking the relationship among the desired control input, u d , and the actual output of the sensors, y, the following relations are obtained:
Under ideal conditions, when the plant is linear, noise and fault free, equation (7) holds. However, when a fault happens, this relation is violated showing the inconsistency between the actuator inputs and sensor outputs with respect to the unfailed model. Using this fact, the generalized parity vector, p(s), is defined as:
The gpv p(s) is the Laplace transformed version of a time varying function of small magnitude under normal operating conditions, due to the presence of noise and modeling errors arising from linearization and order reduction. However, it exhibits a significant magnitude change when a fault occurs. Each distinct failure produces a parity vector with different characteristics, allowing the use of the gpv for isolation purposes. A transformation matrix T r (s) is introduced to make it possible to isolate faults more effectively [14] .
FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION USING DIRECTIONAL RESIDUALS
The basic idea of fdi using failure directions is that each failure will result in activity of the parity vector along a certain axis or in a certain subspace. Depending on the dynamics of the system, some of these reference directions may be close or identical, making the isolation for some faults difficult or unachievable. To overcome the angle separation problem between the reference directions, the calculation of an optimal transformation matrix T r is introduced in section 4.
Actuator Faults
Assuming an additive fault a j (t) in the j th actuator and using the definitions and choice of A o in section 2, the gpv becomes:
Equation (9) shows that p a,j (s) is restricted to exhibit activity along the direction defined by the j th column of N, which we denote B j n [14] .
Actuator fault isolation is thus based on the angle Θ j between the gpv and B j n as illustrated in Fig. 1 . If the j th actuator is faulty, this angle should be zero in the ideal case or less than a small threshold value, T h , to account for model uncertainty, noise and/or unknown disturbances. To make the graphical illustration easier, the gpv in Figs. 1 and 2 is plotted in a 3-dimensional space. However, for the separator model described in [4] and considered here, fdi is performed in a 5-dimensional space, which corresponds to the number of inputs, outputs and states in the system. 
Sensor faults
Similarly, for an additive fault s i (t) in the i th sensor the parity vector in (8) reduces to:
Thus, for the sensor failure case, it is not possible to confine p a,i (s) to lie in a fixed direction. Only for fortuitous cases, depending on the dynamics of the system, can this be achieved. However, for any system, the gpv always lies on a hyperplane in the generalized parity space, defined by the vectors E i d and B i d [14] .
The sensor fault isolation can be based on the angle Θ i , between the gpv and the i th sensor reference hyperplane, SP i , as illustrated in Fig. 2 . If the i th sensor is faulty, this angle should be zero or less than T h . 
TRANSFORMATION MATRIX
The transformation matrix T r plays an important role in fdi using directional residuals. It is desirable to choose T r to increase the separation angle between the original set of reference directions and reference hyperplanes as much as possible, to enhance robustness and maximize the number of faults that can be isolated and the number of disturbances that can be decoupled, beyond the number of outputs of the system [10] .
This can be formulated as a constrained optimization problem, whose objective is to maximize the angles between the transformed reference directions and reference hyperplanes, to the extent possible. These angles were calculated using the subspace function in matlab , which computes the angle between two hyperplanes embedded in a higher dimensional space. The optimization routine maximizes the minimum of F i, j (T r ), where F i, j (T r ) is the objective function containing the angles between the reference directions and reference hyperplanes that are separable. This is implemented by minimizing −F i, j (T r ), using the fminimax function in the matlab optimization toolbox, which uses a sequential quadratic programming (SQP) method. The mathematical formulation is given by:
where c(T r ) ≤ 0 , c eq (T r ) = 0 represent nonlinear inequality and equality constraints, respectively; and Z i and Z j are transformed reference directions, hyperplanes or a combination of both. These directions are given by transforming
The high flexibility of the T r calculation approach proposed using optimization allows us to add different nonlinear constraints to take into account the dynamics of the system and solve some geometrical restrictions. In general, the condition number of T r should be constrained to be small, to avoid obtaining an ill-conditioned transformation matrix and improve the robustness of the FDI response. For further information see [2] .
As the number of inputs and outputs in the system increases, the optimization problem to calculate the transformation matrix becomes more challenging since there are more reference directions and reference hyperplanes to separate. For the separator model described in [4] , the system has five inputs and five outputs, which produces 45 different combinations of reference directions, reference hyperplanes and combination of both to be separated in the objective function. Despite the large amount of separation angles to maximize, the original objective function proposed in (11) was capable of calculating a transformation matrix that maximizes the original set of reference directions and reference hyperplanes well enough to provide clear isolation.
However, since there are five nonparallel hyperplanes, they intersect with each other in a line, regardless of their separation angle. This condition only affects the fdi performance if the faulty steady-state gpv in a situation where a failure is applied to the i th sensor, GP V i ss , lies on or close to the hyperplane intersection. For simplicity, although the separator fdi is performed in a 5-dimensional space, the hyperplane intersection situation illustrated in Fig. 3 is plotted in a 3-dimensional space. th and k th reference hyperplanes are both zero or close to zero, giving an ambiguous isolation. Nevertheless, this ambiguity can be avoided by adding equation (13) to extend the objective function proposed in (11) . This assures that the separation angle between the faulty steadystate gpv for the i th sensor and the k th sensor reference hyperplane is maximized to provide an unambiguous isolation. This can be expressed mathematically as:
GVP MAGNITUDE SIGNATURE
So far, the Generalized Parity Vector magnitude, |GP V |, has been used only for fault detection purposes. However, it is possible to characterize a |GP V | signature for fault size estimation and classification for further use in sensor accommodation. The |GP V | signature is defined by its slope change right after the fault is applied, peak value, |GP V | peak and steady state value, |GP V | ss .
Fault size estimation and classification
The block diagram shown in Fig. 4 summarizes the fault detection, isolation and accommodation process (fdia) using the Generalized Parity Vector technique. If there is no model available or there has been a setpoint change, the identification module is executed using the reconciled inputs-outputs measurements sent by the data reconciliation agent [6] , [1] . Then, the corresponding left coprime factors are calculated using the identified state-space (ss) representation. Once the left coprime factors (lc) are calculated, the gpv magnitude and angles are computed by the residual generator for each input-output set at every sample. Then, the decision maker block provides a detection and isolation decision based on the |GP V | and the ∠GP V min . If the magnitude threshold is exceeded, a fault is detected at t=t f ault and isolated based on ∠GP V min . Also, if the |GP V | slope change at t = t f ault is larger than a predetermined slope threshold, the fdi algorithm classifies the fault as bias type, otherwise a ramp type is declared. Once the detection, isolation and classification are performed, the algorithm proceeds to estimate the fault size, F size , if the isolated fault corresponds to one of the sensors. For the actuator fault case, there is no purpose in calculating F size , since it is not possible to perform accommodation. If a valve is stuck, it cannot be compensated and must be repaired as soon as possible to avoid further damage in the plant. While for the bias case the fault size estimation and classification problem may seem trivial due to the ability to acquire and manipulate simulation data, that is not the case when we are dealing with an actual process. In a real plant, there are limitations on how small the sampling time can be and also, on the amount of data that the supervisory system can send to the fdi agent without overloading the network. For our specific application, a wireless sensor network agent manages real time communications between the control room and the offshore oil facility. For further information on the Petroleum Application of Wireless Systems (PAWS) project see [5] . Therefore, the frequency of the data set received in the control room is also restricted by the wireless network specifications. Figures 5 and 6 show the simulation results using the identified separator model described in [4] for a +15% bias fault applied to the treator vapor pressure sensor (F5). We observe in Fig. 5 that the gpv angle corresponding to fault 5 is the smallest, giving a clear isolation. To illustrate the infeasibility of using the faulty sensor measurement for fault size estimation and classification, we have created this scenario setting the fault to happen at t=100 sec, in the middle of two sampling intervals. Since the sampling period in this simulation is 0.75 sec, the last pressure reading available before the fault occurs is at t=99.75 sec.
In Fig. 5 , it is observed that the pressure measurements change significantly during the first 0.9 sec after the fault happened. This behavior was expected due to the fast dynamics nature of the pressure and the appropriate controller action. From previous simulations results it was established that it is only possible to accurately estimate the fault size for a sampling time of 0.3 sec, since the first reading after the fault occurs is 230 psi at t=100.2 sec. Conversely, if the sampling period is 0.75 sec, the first pressure reading available after the fault was applied is 202.8 psi at t=100.5 sec, giving a wrong fault size estimation of 1.4% which has a 90.67% error. This also affects the fault classification, since the slope change may not be large enough to exceed the specified threshold to declare a bias fault.
Let us assume that the same sampling time of 0.75 sec is used to estimate the fault size and type using the |GP V | signature method proposed above. From Fig. 6 it is observed that the |GP V | at t=100.5 sec is still 994.6 times larger than the fault free |GP V | f f at t=99.75 sec. This sharp slope change allows the classification of this fault as bias type and makes it possible to use the |GP V | value at t=100.5 sec as |GP V | peak for F size = 15%, during the offline curve fitting procedure to obtain the F size vs. |GP V | peak function. After the fault size and type are defined, the accommodation block is implemented as described in section 5.2.
Sensor accommodation
To avoid significant economic losses due to sudden interruptions in the plant operation, sensor accommodation is integrated as part of the fault management strategy. This increases the system reliability and safety, extends useful life, minimizes maintenance and maximizes performance.
Sensor fault accommodation is implemented after the fault size estimation and classification block is executed, as depicted in Fig. 4 . Depending on the control system hardware and software specifications, two different methods can be implemented to compensate a sensor fault as presented below.
Method 1: Sensor reading correction
The sensor reading correction method can be implemented on any plant with software controllers and some with hardware ones, if the sensor outputs can be manipulated before they are sent to the controller. Although it takes some time to estimate the fault type and size before starting the accommodation, this method is still capable of driving the system back to normal operation. The advantage of this method is that once the accommodation starts, it directly corrects the measurement before it is sent to the controller, providing a faster accommodation than method 2.
The basic idea is to correct the measured variable Y meas at every time sample t k , by the relative fault size estimated for the bias case F size.bias (in %/100) and/or the estimated relative value for the ramp case, F size.ramp (in %/100 sec), using the corresponding mathematical relations given in (14) ; this takes into account the effect of both type of faults in the event that a ramp fault happens after the earlier bias fault is isolated and accommodated. The fault sign is obtained from the faulty variable measurement change around its setpoint, right after the fault is detected, and it is included in F size .
where u(t) is the unit step function and t f 1 and t f 2 are the times at which faults 1 and 2 were detected.
Method 2: Setpoint manipulation
Sensor accommodation using setpoint manipulation is proposed as an alternative for those installations where the sensor outputs are directly wired to a physical controller. Given that the sensor output cannot be accessed for correction, the fault is accommodated by manipulating the original variable's setpoint, Y sp.orig . At every sample time t k , a relative delta setpoint ∆Y sp is calculated with the fault size estimated for the bias case F size.bias (in %/100) and/or estimated for the ramp case F size.ramp (in %/100 sec), using the mathematical relation in (15) , taking into account the effect of both types of faults in a situation where a second fault happens after the first one is isolated and accommodated. The accommodated setpoint value Y sp.acc is calculated using (16) .
Since this accommodation technique manipulates the setpoint, its performance depends on how fast the system responds to the control actions. Thus, for variables with slow dynamics, the accommodation process takes longer to completely accommodate the fault due to the large settling time. Although the sensor output cannot be manipulated before being sent to the controller, it is still possible to correct this measurement only for gpv calculation purposes, using (14) . By using Y meas.corr instead of y in (8), the gpv is compensated as well, which permits showing the accommodation behavior in the fdi operator panel. Thus, when the system is completely accommodated, the |GP V | returns to its fault free value, showing that the fault has vanished (Fault # 0), refer to Fig. 10 .
Recursive Fault Size Recalculation
The fault size estimation methods presented in section 5.1 for bias and ramp faults produce very accurate results for both cases. However, since the ramp fault increases its magnitude as time progresses, it requires an estimation error less than 0.001% to provide a correct accommodation during a long period of time. Otherwise, as the time passes, the estimation error is amplified by the (t k − t f ault ) factor, making the accommodation incorrect. To overcome this limitation, a recursive fault size estimation is implemented for each of the methods presented in section 5.2, by calculating the delta of fault size estimation error, ∆ error . It should be noticed that the recursive fault size recalculation cannot start until the accommodation applied using the first F size.ramp reaches its steady state value at t = t acc.ss . This allows obtaining a ∆ error caused by the estimation error, and not by the accommodation transient.
Equations (17) and (19) (18) and (20), for methods 1 and 2 respectively.
∆ error calculation for Method 1:
∆ error calculation for Method 2:
As illustrated in Fig. 4 , the iterative fault size recalculation is performed while the sensor is not fixed.
FAULT DETECTION, ISOLATION AND ACCOMMODATION RESULTS
Using the identified linearized 10 th order state-space model discussed in [4] , fault detection, isolation and accommodation is performed using the gpv technique and the sensor reading correction method presented in section 5.2.1. The simulation scenario illustrated in Figs. 7 to 12 is described as follows: At t=100 sec, a +14.37%/minute ramp fault is applied to the separator liquid volume sensor (F1) which is repaired or replaced later, at about t=2300 sec. This was simulated as a reset signal sent by the supervisory system at that time; the behavior is shown in Fig. 10 . This is followed by a -11.62%/minute ramp fault applied to the treator water volume sensor (F3) at t=3000 sec, which is In Fig. 7 it is observed that the separator liquid volume measurement completed its accommodation approximately 900 sec after the fault was applied. This was expected from its slow dynamics, which is reflected in the gpv behavior. Figure 9 shows that the |GP V | ss is not reached until approximately t=520 sec. As a result, F size.ramp is estimated at that time and the accommodation is started. Once the accommodation started at t=520 sec, the |GP V | decreases rapidly towards its |GP V | f f value, which is the criteria to declare a total fault compensation. This is illustrated in the operator panel in Fig.  10 .
From 0 sec to 100 sec, fault #0 is displayed, which corresponds to the fault free case. After the fault happened at t=100 sec, there were 20 sec of unknown abnormal behavior represented by fault #-1 in the operator panel. During this period isolation was not possible due to the transient affecting the gpv angles. However, once the transient is finished, the identified fault is correctly displayed in sec, faults #0 and #1 are displayed (primarily fault #0), indicating that the fault was successfully accommodated, but still, the sensor needs to be fixed or replaced. At about t=2300 sec, the reset signal notifying that the sensor problem has been solved, is received from the supervisory system. As a result, the operator panel stops displaying fault #1 and remains showing fault #0 until the second fault is detected.
At t=3000 sec, the |GP V | increases significantly again, due to the treator water volume sensor fault applied at that time. This is shown in the operator panel as fault #3. It is observed in Fig. 9 that the |GP V | ss is reached faster than for the separator liquid volume sensor case, due to the treator's faster dynamics. Therefore, the fault size estimation and accommodation started at t=3096 sec, giving a complete accommodation only 160 sec after the fault happens. This is shown as fault #0 and #3 in Fig.  10 , from t=3160 sec until the end of the simulation. This indicates that sensor 3 is still faulty but the fault has been successfully accommodated. Figures 11 and 12 show the ∆ error and recursive fault size recalculation using (17) and (18) respectively. It is observed that ∆ error decreases with time as the fault size is recalculated. Since it is not possible to obtain 100% accuracy on F size estimation, the recalculated fault size oscillates around the actual value accordingly with the variations in ∆ error .
CONCLUSION
A complete fault detection, isolation and accommodation technique using the gpv approach has been successfully tested on a large-scale industrial process in the absence of an a priori mathematical model. The |GP V | signature concept has been defined and exploited to implement a fault size estimation and classification algorithm. Sensor bias faults are directly accommodated; sensor ramp fault accommodation has been accomplished by integrating a recursive fault size recalculation algorithm based on the accommodation error. Two different algorithms taking into account the software and hardware implementations in the plant have been effectively developed for sensor ramp faults and bias compensation.
